
Hungary’s new government is expected to move away from the ideologically driven, leader-to-leader relationships that characterised Viktor Orbán’s approach to the Western Balkans, while maintaining economic and technical cooperation with the region. This was the central takeaway from the panel titled “New Partner, Same Csárdás?”
Hungary and the Western Balkans after Orbán” at the Belgrade Security Conference. The discussion brought together Ferenc Németh, Senior Research Fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs; Anastasia Mgaloblishvili, Researcher at the Free University of Berlin; Dane Taleski, Distinguished Fellow at the Prespa Institute and former Ambassador of North Macedonia to NATO; and Srđan Cvijić, President of the International Advisory Committee of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Péter Krekó, Executive Director of Political Capital, moderated the panel.

Responding to Krekó’s question about the future of Hungarian-Serbian relations, Németh described the new approach as “Csárdás 2.0” – a “fine-tuned version” of Hungary’s foreign policy toward the region. He stressed that the Western Balkans had long been a priority for Budapest, noting that this focus “didn’t start with Orbán, and it definitely didn’t end with Orbán’s departure.” According to Németh, the shift will be qualitative rather than quantitative: “The change will be considered a change in quality, the approach will be different, and the quantity will remain the same.” He expects Hungary’s strategic partnership with Serbia to remain intact, while Budapest moves towards “a more traditional bilateral approach rather than focusing on leader-to-leader cooperation”. This would mean an end to public funding for local strongmen and interference in election campaigns. Németh concluded that Hungary now has an opportunity to become “a different kind of role model for the region.”

For Cvijić, Hungary’s democratic victory was “a giant inspiration for the student movement in Serbia.” He expects Budapest’s support for EU enlargement to continue, including support for opening Cluster 3 “as soon as the new government is formed.” Reflecting on relations under Orbán and Vučić, Cvijić described the rapprochement between the two countries as little more than a “salon reconciliation” among politicians, while Serbs and Hungarians in Vojvodina “remained living as two separate islands.” The future relationship, he argued, should be based on “economic interdependence minus political patronage.” Turning to Serbia’s new foreign policy programme, Cvijić described it as “quite general and vague,” pointing to its combination of rejecting sanctions against Russia and a firm commitment to EU integration. He characterised the challenge facing Serbia’s future leadership as one of balancing political principles with pragmatism: “I see a successful government and a foreign minister as a kamikaze, as somebody who means well for Serbia, wants to implement this program as much as possible, but is also pragmatic.” Offering citizens a different political narrative will take time, Cvijić concluded, noting that “it’s difficult to cancel 14 years in a couple of months, but there is a chance.”

Reflecting on North Macedonia’s experience, Taleski described its past relations with Hungary as “deeply personalistic” and “a very heated romance”. The former ambassador recalled Orbán’s arrival in Ohrid in 2017 to launch VMRO-DPMNE’s local election campaign, as well as Hungary’s decision to grant asylum to former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski. He also described the Hungarian loan to North Macedonia as “still a black box”, noting that bilateral relations had since shifted from “a very heated romance” to a “cool-off”. Speaking in a personal capacity, Taleski expressed the view that the government in Skopje is reassessing its options for cooperation with Budapest. Nevertheless, he emphasised that Hungary remains a valuable NATO ally and that NATO continues to place a high value on its contributions to KFOR and EUFOR.
Shifting the focus beyond the region, Mgaloblishvili explained that Hungary’s engagement in Georgia, unlike in the Western Balkans, was driven purely by political considerations and intensified in 2022, when the EU adopted a more critical stance towards Tbilisi. According to Mgaloblishvili, Budapest helped Georgian Dream deflect EU pressure by blocking sanctions and joint EU statements, undermining the Union’s messages and promoting illiberal ideology. With Orbán’s departure, the EU now has greater room to manoeuvre in addressing Georgia’s autocratisation. The Berlin-based researcher cautioned, however, that Georgian Dream “no longer really needs to appear as pro-European”, as the ruling party increasingly relies on overt repression, the criminalisation of protests and bans on opposition parties. Németh considered it unlikely that Hungary’s new government would oppose sanctions but warned that within the EU, “once one bad guy disappears, another one shows up,” pointing to Fico as a potential new obstacle.

Overall, the panellists agreed that the change of government in Budapest represents a significant shift in Hungary’s relations with both the Western Balkans and Georgia. This relationship is expected to rely less on personal ties between political leaders and more on institutionalised, transparent and bilateral cooperation, while much of the economic and strategic framework established over the past years is likely to remain intact.

