BSC, Author at BELGRADE SECURITY CONFERENCE 2026 https://belgradesecurityconference.org/author/bsc2022/ BSC2026 Thu, 19 Nov 2026 11:56:10 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.5 https://belgradesecurityconference.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/bsc-favico.png BSC, Author at BELGRADE SECURITY CONFERENCE 2026 https://belgradesecurityconference.org/author/bsc2022/ 32 32 After the Midterms: The Future of American Democracy and its Implications for Europe https://belgradesecurityconference.org/after-the-midterms-the-future-of-american-democracy-and-its-implications-for-europe/ Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:46:27 +0000 https://belgradesecurityconference.org/?p=6775 One of the final panels at the Belgrade Security Conference (BSC) 2026, “After the Midterms: The Future of American Democracy and its Implications for Europe,” concluded that while the Democratic sweep of both chambers of Congress reflects widespread voter dissatisfaction with living expenses, tariffs, the war in Iran and perceived corruption, it will not restore […]

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One of the final panels at the Belgrade Security Conference (BSC) 2026, “After the Midterms: The Future of American Democracy and its Implications for Europe,” concluded that while the Democratic sweep of both chambers of Congress reflects widespread voter dissatisfaction with living expenses, tariffs, the war in Iran and perceived corruption, it will not restore the pre-Trump transatlantic order.

Moderated by Nikola Burazer, Programme Director at the Centre for Contemporary Politics and Executive Editor of European Western Balkans, the discussion reached a consensus: Trump-era foreign policy has established a new, transactional baseline that future U.S. administrations of either party will build on, rather than reverse. With Washington increasingly viewing global affairs through strategic competition, Europe can no longer defer critical security and political choices while waiting for a return to unconditional American leadership.

Examining the institutional limits of the midterm shift, Laurel Rapp, Director of the US and North America Programme at Chatham House, emphasised that the executive branch has broad latitude over military deployments and bilateral dealmaking, even as a Democratic Congress prepares to use budget authority and oversight investigations targeting self-enrichment, foreign ties and Iran ahead of 2028. Drawing on Chatham House interviews with over 30 U.S. political leaders, Rapp noted that the norm that “politics stops at the water’s edge” has eroded, warning that the 1990s and the Biden administration likely marked the “high-water mark” of U.S.-Europe relations. She urged Europe to plan for U.S. troop drawdowns, accelerate the Europeanisation of NATO and anchor cooperation in concrete economic and supply-chain initiatives.

Turning to the resilience of American democracy in response to a question from moderator Nikola Burazer, Melissa Hooper, Executive Director of the Center for Constitutional Democracy at the UC Law School, rejected the premise that democratic erosion can still be prevented: “We were unable to prevent it. We really have been sliding for a long time, so we are in it.” Pointing to three domestic guards holding the line, federal courts (including Trump-appointed judges) blocking unlawful firings, frozen funds and birthright citizenship restrictions despite daily death threats; watchdogs like CREW and the Brennan Center; Democratic-led states invoking federalism, Hooper argued that the U.S. must replace fragile norms with enforceable laws. She added that the abrupt shutdown of USAID, in her view, by personal interference from Elon Musk and a push for discretionary dealmaking, turned Washington from a global problem-solver into a source of instability, making U.S. civil society look to Southeast Europe for lessons in peaceful resistance.

For Europe and the Western Balkans, Robin S. Brooks, Visiting Fellow in Global Policy and Governance at Pomona College, warned that continuing Europe’s “great waiting out”, delaying strategic commitments in hopes that a future U.S. election will restore traditional American engagement, is unsustainable. Noting that the Balkans are not a top priority for the White House or Congress beyond targeted corruption oversight, Brooks argued that European governments must forge a cohesive, interests-based security policy and take local ownership of regional challenges rather than waiting for Washington. She added that dismantling USAID undercut U.S. soft power, hurt American farmers and businesses reliant on rule-of-law frameworks abroad and forced dismissed aid workers to start from a “zero base”.

In the brief Q&A session, audience questions addressed whether the midterms signal a lasting political realignment ahead of 2028, how Democrats will approach national security strategy and how Serbia’s incoming leadership should engage Washington. Panellists noted that the shift shows the U.S. electorate remains responsive as Democrats debate China, trade and the Middle East ahead of an open 2028 race, creating a “laboratory of ideas” for allies to shape future U.S. foreign policy platforms. On engaging Washington, they urged Serbia’s incoming government to rely on qualified diplomats over paid lobbyists while calling on Serbian citizens to grant the new leadership brief grace as it builds consensus on complex policy challenges.

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New Technologies for Peacebuilding and Human Rights Protection: Opportunities and Risks https://belgradesecurityconference.org/new-technologies-for-peacebuilding-and-human-rights-protection-opportunities-and-risks/ Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:34:00 +0000 https://belgradesecurityconference.org/?p=6768 At the Belgrade Security Conference, panel moderator Nino Gogoladze opened the discussion titled “New Technologies for Peacebuilding and Human Rights Protection: Opportunities and Risks.” The session examined the dual-edged nature of artificial intelligence and digital technologies, exploring how they can serve as powerful tools for enhancing fundamental rights, conflict prevention and civic engagement, while simultaneously […]

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At the Belgrade Security Conference, panel moderator Nino Gogoladze opened the discussion titled “New Technologies for Peacebuilding and Human Rights Protection: Opportunities and Risks.” The session examined the dual-edged nature of artificial intelligence and digital technologies, exploring how they can serve as powerful tools for enhancing fundamental rights, conflict prevention and civic engagement, while simultaneously posing severe risks to privacy, data security and democratic institutions.

Panellists emphasised that the rapid proliferation of digital surveillance and automated tools often leads to reactive, fragmented governance rather than anticipatory safeguards. A central consensus emerged that technological adoption must not be driven by a blind pursuit of efficiency or state control; instead, robust legal frameworks, transparency and a people-centric approach must ensure that technology actively protects human rights rather than eroding them.

Carolina Hidea, Head of the OSCE Mission to Serbia, emphasised that while AI offers many opportunities for public participation and reconciliation, its responsible use requires reliable information, verifiable data, and strict protections for personal privacy. 

Dušan Pokuševski, Programme Director at the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, addressed the ambivalent impact of digital technologies on civic freedoms in Serbia, noting that while tech can enhance expression, it has similarly been weaponised to stifle peaceful assembly and subject key political actors to unlawful digital surveillance. To counter these threats, Pokuševski outlined three essential pillars for the future: “Binding legal safeguards backed by independent judicial and institutional oversight… genuine accountability of the tech sector through great transparency… and media and informational literacy for citizens.”

Katarina Bojović, Director of Digital Diplomacy at Diplo, criticised current global governance frameworks for being overly reactive and driven by an alarmist “existential threat” narrative rather than addressing existing, tangible risks like deepfakes and algorithmic bias. Highlighting the power asymmetries and lack of accountability in commercial AI models, Bojović advocated for bottom-up, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) tools hosted locally by institutions: “We need to be in control of our tools. We need to curate the knowledge and ensure that we use an open-source platform that is hosted by our institution,” warning against the dangers of uncritical reliance on commercial models where sensitive data and staff chats are inevitably handed over to vendors. 

Andrijana Ristić, Policy Advisor at the SHARE Foundation, focused heavily on the growing risks of state-sponsored digital repression, pointing out the widespread, often illegal deployment of facial recognition cameras, social card algorithms and advanced commercial spyware in Serbia. Warning that technology is increasingly outpacing regulatory capacity, Ristić urged decision-makers to “slow down with this integration of AI without having a proper legal-technical framework… and put human rights at every corner of every decision.”

Representing the OSCE Dialogue Academy for Young Women, Jadranka Mašić Pavlović and alumna Elona Matosi demonstrated how civil society can proactively engage with new technologies rather than merely reacting to them. Through a capacity-building AI apprenticeship with Diplo, Dialogue Academy members developed customised internal AI assistants and a groundbreaking draft code of conduct for ethical AI use. Matosi underscored a vital lesson from their hands-on work: “AI adoption doesn’t start with choosing the tool, but rather with understanding people and their needs,” stressing the constant necessity to fact-check outputs, protect organisational data privacy against systemic biases and ensure we understand how these technologies work before blindly trusting them with our knowledge.

The discussion concluded with an engaging Q&A session concerning international conflicts, legal modernisation, and judicial accountability. Audience members raised pressing concerns regarding the military application of AI systems, such as automated targeting programmes deployed in Gaza, and the troubling lack of international transparency or accountability for civilian casualties. Additional discussions addressed the transformation of legal practice through specialised legal Large Language Models, alongside a warning from panellists about “cognitive recession” and the loss of critical thinking among professionals over-relying on automated shortcuts. Concluding the session, panellists stressed that society must shift from passive adaptation to active participation, ensuring that citizens and civil society retain control over digital tools to prevent sensitive information from being exploited by corporate and state actors.

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New Partner, Same Csárdás? Hungary and the Western Balkans after Orbán https://belgradesecurityconference.org/new-partner-same-csardas-hungary-and-the-western-balkans-after-orban/ Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:41:30 +0000 https://belgradesecurityconference.org/?p=6802   Hungary’s new government is expected to move away from the ideologically driven, leader-to-leader relationships that characterised Viktor Orbán’s approach to the Western Balkans, while maintaining economic and technical cooperation with the region. This was the central takeaway from the panel titled “New Partner, Same Csárdás?” Hungary and the Western Balkans after Orbán” at the […]

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Hungary’s new government is expected to move away from the ideologically driven, leader-to-leader relationships that characterised Viktor Orbán’s approach to the Western Balkans, while maintaining economic and technical cooperation with the region. This was the central takeaway from the panel titled “New Partner, Same Csárdás?”

Hungary and the Western Balkans after Orbán” at the Belgrade Security Conference. The discussion brought together Ferenc Németh, Senior Research Fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs; Anastasia Mgaloblishvili, Researcher at the Free University of Berlin; Dane Taleski, Distinguished Fellow at the Prespa Institute and former Ambassador of North Macedonia to NATO; and Srđan Cvijić, President of the International Advisory Committee of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Péter Krekó, Executive Director of Political Capital, moderated the panel.

 

 

Responding to Krekó’s question about the future of Hungarian-Serbian relations, Németh described the new approach as “Csárdás 2.0” – a “fine-tuned version” of Hungary’s foreign policy toward the region. He stressed that the Western Balkans had long been a priority for Budapest, noting that this focus “didn’t start with Orbán, and it definitely didn’t end with Orbán’s departure.” According to Németh, the shift will be qualitative rather than quantitative: “The change will be considered a change in quality, the approach will be different, and the quantity will remain the same.” He expects Hungary’s strategic partnership with Serbia to remain intact, while Budapest moves towards “a more traditional bilateral approach rather than focusing on leader-to-leader cooperation”. This would mean an end to public funding for local strongmen and interference in election campaigns. Németh concluded that Hungary now has an opportunity to become “a different kind of role model for the region.”

 

 

For Cvijić, Hungary’s democratic victory was “a giant inspiration for the student movement in Serbia.” He expects Budapest’s support for EU enlargement to continue, including support for opening Cluster 3 “as soon as the new government is formed.” Reflecting on relations under Orbán and Vučić, Cvijić described the rapprochement between the two countries as little more than a “salon reconciliation” among politicians, while Serbs and Hungarians in Vojvodina “remained living as two separate islands.” The future relationship, he argued, should be based on “economic interdependence minus political patronage.” Turning to Serbia’s new foreign policy programme, Cvijić described it as “quite general and vague,” pointing to its combination of rejecting sanctions against Russia and a firm commitment to EU integration. He characterised the challenge facing Serbia’s future leadership as one of balancing political principles with pragmatism: “I see a successful government and a foreign minister as a kamikaze, as somebody who means well for Serbia, wants to implement this program as much as possible, but is also pragmatic.” Offering citizens a different political narrative will take time, Cvijić concluded, noting that “it’s difficult to cancel 14 years in a couple of months, but there is a chance.”

 

 

Reflecting on North Macedonia’s experience, Taleski described its past relations with Hungary as “deeply personalistic” and “a very heated romance”. The former ambassador recalled Orbán’s arrival in Ohrid in 2017 to launch VMRO-DPMNE’s local election campaign, as well as Hungary’s decision to grant asylum to former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski. He also described the Hungarian loan to North Macedonia as “still a black box”, noting that bilateral relations had since shifted from “a very heated romance” to a “cool-off”. Speaking in a personal capacity, Taleski expressed the view that the government in Skopje is reassessing its options for cooperation with Budapest. Nevertheless, he emphasised that Hungary remains a valuable NATO ally and that NATO continues to place a high value on its contributions to KFOR and EUFOR.

Shifting the focus beyond the region, Mgaloblishvili explained that Hungary’s engagement in Georgia, unlike in the Western Balkans, was driven purely by political considerations and intensified in 2022, when the EU adopted a more critical stance towards Tbilisi. According to Mgaloblishvili, Budapest helped Georgian Dream deflect EU pressure by blocking sanctions and joint EU statements, undermining the Union’s messages and promoting illiberal ideology. With Orbán’s departure, the EU now has greater room to manoeuvre in addressing Georgia’s autocratisation. The Berlin-based researcher cautioned, however, that Georgian Dream “no longer really needs to appear as pro-European”, as the ruling party increasingly relies on overt repression, the criminalisation of protests and bans on opposition parties. Németh considered it unlikely that Hungary’s new government would oppose sanctions but warned that within the EU, “once one bad guy disappears, another one shows up,” pointing to Fico as a potential new obstacle.

 

 

Overall, the panellists agreed that the change of government in Budapest represents a significant shift in Hungary’s relations with both the Western Balkans and Georgia. This relationship is expected to rely less on personal ties between political leaders and more on institutionalised, transparent and bilateral cooperation, while much of the economic and strategic framework established over the past years is likely to remain intact.

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Public Presentation of SecuriMeter 2026 Report – Western Balkans Regional Security Perceptions https://belgradesecurityconference.org/public-presentation-of-securimeter-2026-report-western-balkans-regional-security-perceptions/ Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:08:47 +0000 https://belgradesecurityconference.org/?p=6732 Despite a more positive perception of regional security, economic hardship, weak institutional trust and emigration remain major concerns for citizens across the Western Balkans, according to the Regional Cooperation Council’s (RCC) SecuriMeter 2026 report, presented at the Belgrade Security Conference on a panel moderated by Pavle Janković, Head of the Political Department of the Regional […]

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Despite a more positive perception of regional security, economic hardship, weak institutional trust and emigration remain major concerns for citizens across the Western Balkans, according to the Regional Cooperation Council’s (RCC) SecuriMeter 2026 report, presented at the Belgrade Security Conference on a panel moderated by Pavle Janković, Head of the Political Department of the Regional Cooperation Council.

The survey results, conducted among 6,003 respondents across the six Western Balkan economies in September and presented by Aner Zuković, Senior Security Advisor, Regional Cooperation Council, found that 57% consider their own country a secure place to live, compared with 49% last year. Perceptions of the region’s security also improved, rising from 38% to 49%. However, these figures coexist with widespread concerns about the future, particularly the possibility of conflict, the effects of international wars and economic instability.

Financial pressures remain the most prominent source of concern, with 83% of respondents worried about the cost of living and inflation, followed by depopulation and emigration (78%), and employment opportunities and wages (73%). The survey also revealed that 29% are considering moving abroad, with this figure rising to 58% among respondents aged 18 to 24. Jorida Shytaj, Executive Director of Europe Plus, argued that these figures should also be understood as a reflection of young people’s uncertainty about their prospects in the region.

The findings also point to a significant gap between citizens’ expectations of democratic governance and their confidence in political institutions. While 88% consider equal application of the law critical, 52% believe public institutions do not treat people equally, regardless of social status, political views or ethnic background. Confidence in political parties stands at just 16%, compared with 25% for parliaments and 31% for governments. Daliborka Uljarević, Executive Director of the Centre for Civic Education, argued that institutions must become more predictable, accountable and transparent if they are to regain public confidence. “The problem is not that citizens expect too much from democracy. I think that the problem is that institutions fail to deliver the minimum of the democratic standards that the citizens of the region deserve,” she said.

Speaking about the improved perception of regional security, Filip Ejdus, Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade, noted that the more positive assessment of regional security comes despite growing concerns about the consequences of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as declining confidence in the EU and NATO. He offered several possible explanations, including an improved sense of personal security among citizens, greater satisfaction with police performance, and easing tensions in two regional flashpoints – Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the constitutional crisis of 2025 had subsided, and Kosovo, where elections and the reintegration of Kosovo Serbs into institutions contributed to an improved security situation. Ejdus also stressed that subjective perceptions of security are just as important as objective security conditions and can sometimes be even more important.

The panel also examined the relationship between institutional confidence, economic conditions and perceptions of safety. Adnan Efendić, Professor of Economics at the University of Sarajevo, presented the value of econometric models in identifying connections between different factors shaping individual security perceptions. Meanwhile, former North Macedonian Ambassador to NATO, Dane Taleski, discussed the influence of domestic political discourse and international engagement on public attitudes towards the EU and NATO. The survey found that 49% of respondents expressed confidence in the EU and 48% in NATO, with both figures slightly lower than in the previous edition.

 

Overall, SecuriMeter 2026 suggests that feeling safer does not necessarily mean feeling more secure about the future. Alongside regional security concerns, the findings point to the need for stronger public institutions, greater economic stability and renewed efforts to address the reasons driving young people to consider leaving the Western Balkans.

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From Party Control to Professional Governance: Rebuilding the State https://belgradesecurityconference.org/from-party-control-to-professional-governance-rebuilding-the-state/ Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:07:52 +0000 https://belgradesecurityconference.org/?p=6762 The panel “From Party Control to Professional Governance: Rebuilding the State” focused on the role of a professional and politically neutral civil service in preventing and resisting state capture. Drawing on experiences from Poland, Hungary, the USA and Serbia, the panellists explored how governments can restore effective governance, dismantle captured institutions and strengthen the role […]

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The panel “From Party Control to Professional Governance: Rebuilding the State” focused on the role of a professional and politically neutral civil service in preventing and resisting state capture. Drawing on experiences from Poland, Hungary, the USA and Serbia, the panellists explored how governments can restore effective governance, dismantle captured institutions and strengthen the role of the civil service in this process.

Through historical examples, policy experiences and political theory, they identified practical lessons for building a professional state that is both democratically accountable and resistant to political capture. One of the panel’s key takeaways for future reformers, particularly in countries such as Serbia, was the importance of communicating reforms effectively. Public understanding of the process and the decisions behind it is essential for securing public support and building a resilient society capable of resisting a return to the former corrupt system.

The panel opened with introductory remarks by the moderator, Miloš Hrnjaz, Associate Professor and Vice Dean for Undergraduate Studies at the University of Belgrade’s Faculty of Political Science, who outlined the topic and context of the discussion.

Bálint Madlovics, Research Fellow at the CEU’s Democracy Institute, outlined three types of states: corrupt, captured and criminal, explaining how corruption evolves from isolated instances into systemic practices involving the entire state apparatus. He also introduced the concept of amplitude of arbitrariness, linking corruption to democratic backsliding. Contrasting Weberian and patronised bureaucracy, he stressed the importance of personal, institutional and financial independence to ensure effective institutional autonomy. Drawing on Poland’s experience, he highlighted these principles as essential for institutional reform. Turning to Serbia, he described the situation as “a change of regime, with a mandate to change everything”, rather than simply a change of government. He stressed that reforms must go beyond dismantling the existing system and include safeguards against its return.

Wojciech Przybylski, editor of Visegrad Insight and president of the Res Publica Foundation, shared lessons from Poland’s democratic transitions in the 1990s and 2023–2024. He stressed that “democracy is an ideological project worth fighting for, but not a given”, identifying political elites, geography, national history and chance as factors shaping democratic change. Citing Poland’s 1989 macroeconomic reforms, he emphasised the need for bold decisions while maintaining a balance between economic results and political stability. He also warned that although voters reward politicians who deliver on their promises, this can create opportunities for populism. He concluded by calling for a renewed sense of public duty within the civil service.

Melissa Hooper, Executive Director of the Center for Constitutional Democracy at UC Law San Francisco, discussed institutional changes in the United States under the current administration, highlighting weakened checks and balances, politically motivated dismissals of military generals and the broad interpretation of Article II of the US Constitution. She also warned that professional standards within the Department of Justice had eroded, including the presumption of regularity and concerns over misleading statements by lawyers in court proceedings. Looking ahead, she stressed the need to restore recruitment standards, address the Department of Justice’s “culture of lying” and prepare reforms for implementation under a future administration from 2029. Her key recommendation was to maintain clear public communication to build understanding and support for reforms.

The panel concluded with a Q&A session, during which panellists expanded on their views and shared additional experiences, including Georgia’s. They emphasised the importance of maintaining balance throughout the long-term process of dismantling state capture.

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Can Europe Afford to not Complete Itself? From Gradual Integration to Full Membership https://belgradesecurityconference.org/can-europe-afford-to-not-complete-itself-from-gradual-integration-to-full-membership/ Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:05:10 +0000 https://belgradesecurityconference.org/?p=6743 The panel brought together five panellists, two from the EU and two from candidate countries, to discuss the future of the EU enlargement process, as well as the potential timeline and challenges to accession for the countries of the Western Balkans. Julian Vessallo, Chargé d’Affaires of the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic […]

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The panel brought together five panellists, two from the EU and two from candidate countries, to discuss the future of the EU enlargement process, as well as the potential timeline and challenges to accession for the countries of the Western Balkans.

Julian Vessallo, Chargé d’Affaires of the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia, delivered opening remarks before the discussion, emphasising that the region is still able to accede. He expressed optimism for deeper integration between the region and the EU in the future.
In the discussion, moderated by Majlinda Bregu, Strategic Advisor at Europe Plus and Former Secretary General at the Regional Cooperation Council, the panellists broadly agreed that accession was progressing, but that significant changes would need to be seen before full accession for the region is possible. Panellists from the candidate countries generally pointed to the EU as needing to soften some of its prospective safeguarding proposals if it wants to keep the door open for the region. While panellists from member states did not fully disagree with this, they argued that the EU also needs to see more work from the region to show that reforms are actually being implemented.
Matteo Bonomi, Head of the Europe Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali, noted that enlargement has always been an evolving process and argued that while member states were unlikely to be ready to stomach a new process entirely, more could be done to fund the procedural institutions that already exist to help deepen support for the region’s integration.
Srđan Majstorović, Chairman of the Governing Board of the European Policy Centre (CEP), was optimistic about the fresh start that the elections in Serbia represent for getting the country back on track with its accession process. He highlighted regional cooperation as an area in which Serbia and its neighbours have significant room to improve, one which could help demonstrate their seriousness and democratic maturity to the EU and stated that he believed Serbian society will be in a much better place four years from now thanks to the recent elections.
Matej Zakonjšek, Independent Adviser on European Connectivity and former Director of the Transport Community Secretariat, noted that it is important to remember that, in the big picture, our integration is always happening, both for candidate countries and for member states. He noted that under the right conditions things in the region can move quickly, as was the case for establishing green lanes for transport during COVID, and expressed hope that a similar commitment and drive could be applied to accession reform as well.
Dragana Jaćimović, Executive Coordinator at Institute Alternative, expressed hope for Montenegro’s entry into the EU by 2028. She also noted that, perhaps despite its own wishes, Montenegro will likely serve as a test case or role model for reforms to the EU’s accession process. She expressed concern about the lengthy 15-year safeguarding period currently proposed for new member states, stating that she would favour lowering the potential safeguards while still keeping some in place.
Boris Mijatović, Member of the German Bundestag, highlighted the need for further effort from the region as the main hurdle to accession, noting that many reform efforts have too often been only for show to appease the EU and do not represent a genuine effort to undertake societal and political reform. He noted that enlargement is not only an issue in candidate countries but also in member states and argued that safeguards are necessary to get member states who are worried about corruption in the region on board with enlargement.

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Are We Ready for it? Making the EU Fit for Enlargement https://belgradesecurityconference.org/are-we-ready-for-it-making-the-eu-fit-for-enlargement/ Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:28:36 +0000 https://belgradesecurityconference.org/?p=6753 After more than two decades of discussions about the Western Balkans’ readiness to join the European Union, a different question is becoming increasingly important: is the EU itself ready for enlargement? This was the central question of a panel discussion at the Belgrade Security Conference, moderated by Andi Dobrushi, Director of the Open Society Foundations […]

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After more than two decades of discussions about the Western Balkans’ readiness to join the European Union, a different question is becoming increasingly important: is the EU itself ready for enlargement? This was the central question of a panel discussion at the Belgrade Security Conference, moderated by Andi Dobrushi, Director of the Open Society Foundations Western Balkans.

The discussion opened with remarks by Dietmar Schweisgut, Secretary General of the Austro-French Centre for Rapprochement in Europe and former Head of the EU Delegation to Japan and China. He stressed the importance of bridging debates in Brussels and the Western Balkans, noting that misunderstandings often arise from their different historical, economic and political perspectives on enlargement. The panel sought to explore these differences and identify possible ways forward. While participants agreed on the geopolitical importance of enlargement, they also highlighted persistent political disagreements within the EU, the use of veto powers and limited public support as major obstacles to the process.

 

Tanja Fajon, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovenia, argued that enlargement is a geostrategic necessity and that the EU cannot afford to miss the current opportunity. Asked about the obstacles to introducing qualified majority voting at certain stages of accession negotiations, she argued that it could prevent bilateral disputes from repeatedly blocking progress. She acknowledged, however, that member states had yet to reach a consensus on the proposal. She also stressed that candidate countries must continue implementing reforms, while EU member states need to prepare their own societies for enlargement.

 

Adélaide Dewavrin, Head of Mission at the External Relations Department of the Directorate for the EU at the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, similarly stressed that geopolitical urgency should serve to accelerate reforms, not replace them. Addressing concerns about public support, particularly in France, she emphasised that citizens need to understand the tangible benefits of enlargement and see concrete results from reforms in candidate countries.

The problem of vetoes and political blockages was raised by Péter Mocsáry, Adviser to the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs. He argued that the numerous opportunities for member states to block different stages of accession make the process unnecessarily complicated. Referring to Serbia’s negotiations, he noted that some positions had remained blocked in the Council for six or seven years. He called for ways to accelerate integration and emphasised regional cooperation and the exchange of institutional experience as important tools in preparing candidate countries for membership.

Erwan Fouéré, Associate Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and former EU Special Representative and Head of Delegation in North Macedonia, addressed the impact of bilateral disputes on enlargement. Responding to the question of where legitimate accession conditions end and political demands begin, he criticised the use of veto power to impose national interpretations of history on candidate countries, particularly in the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia. He argued that different historical narratives should be acknowledged and that bilateral disagreements should not determine the future of EU enlargement.

Stefan Lehne, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe, addressed the question of whether new member states could face different conditions from those that joined the EU in previous enlargements. He questioned the proposed safeguards under which new members could lose certain voting rights for up to 15 years if they violate EU values, warning that such measures could create a sense of second-class membership. Asked whether Montenegro could join the EU by 2028 under the current treaties, he acknowledged the country’s accelerated reform efforts. However, he questioned whether its accession, followed by years without further enlargement, would be enough to demonstrate that the process was genuinely moving forward. He also highlighted Ukraine’s European perspective as an important part of the EU’s wider security considerations.

The discussion returned to the central question: is the EU ready to welcome the Western Balkans? Participants stressed that enlargement requires not only continued reforms in candidate countries but also political commitment from EU member states, including overcoming bilateral disputes and building public support. The key question is therefore whether the EU is ready to turn its commitment to enlargement into reality.

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Integrity Network against State Capture: How Citizens Can Reclaim the State https://belgradesecurityconference.org/integrity-network-against-state-capture-how-citizens-can-reclaim-the-state/ Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:26:51 +0000 https://belgradesecurityconference.org/?p=6719   At a roundtable held on 18 November 2026 as part of the Belgrade Security Conference (BSC), panellists examined concrete steps to dismantle state capture and rebuild institutions following democratic change, placing special emphasis on safeguards to prevent capture from recurring. Moderator Jelena Pejić Nikić, Senior Researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), […]

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At a roundtable held on 18 November 2026 as part of the Belgrade Security Conference (BSC), panellists examined concrete steps to dismantle state capture and rebuild institutions following democratic change, placing special emphasis on safeguards to prevent capture from recurring.

Moderator Jelena Pejić Nikić, Senior Researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), noted that mapping and empowering “pockets of integrity” across the judiciary, police and media was vital to keeping institutions from collapsing under pressure, stressing that these three sectors are “the main elements of state capture and the main elements of uncapturing it.” 

Analysing conditions and safeguards in the judiciary and police, Savo Đurđić, retired judge of the Appellate Court in Novi Sad, pointed to nearly one million unresolved cases and stalled proceedings, while the prosecution only began waking up just ahead of the elections by ordering decisions on citizen complaints within 48 hours. Warning against mere cosmetic changes or leaving loopholes for extra-institutional pressure, he stated that “there must be no more simplified procedures” and called for disciplinary and criminal accountability, an operational prosecutorial police, administrative court reform and transparent public debates. 

Bogoljub Živković, retired Police General, assessed that state capture was most visible in the police being reduced to a political tool, emphasising that recovery requires immediate personnel changes, a stable organisational structure, clear legal separation between the minister and an operationally independent Police Directorate, reformed internal and civilian oversight and accountability for command inaction. He cautioned that “this must be a process, and it must be clearly planned and implemented precisely so that something like this is not allowed to happen to us again.”

Addressing the media sector, Željko Bodrožić, President of the Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS), noted that Serbia fell to 104th place on the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index (its worst result in 23 years), while attacks and pressures against journalists were recorded over the past year continuously. Bodrožić emphasised that lasting protection of media freedom requires a fresh election of all members of the REM Council, reviews of public broadcasters, individual accountability for violating professional standards and stronger labour protections for young and local journalists, stressing that “the goal must be building a system that guarantees the public service belongs to the citizens and that its editorial policy will not depend on the authorities.”

Drawing on regional lessons on preventing backsliding, Lenche Ristoska, former prosecutor and co-founder of the Institute for Transparency and Integrity in North Macedonia, highlighted that financial independence of the judiciary and prosecution from the executive, dedicated prosecutorial investigative centres and specialised units for external oversight of the police are vital for dispersing power. She warned that some networks can exploit opportunism within heterogeneous movements and invoke “national and political reconciliation” to evade criminal liability, urging participants to “never make compromises with justice” and emphasising that media and civil society must not “fall asleep” but continue to critically observe the new authorities.

Framing the central legal dilemma of democratic transition, moderator Jelena Pejić Nikić asked Maria Victoria Kristan, a legal scholar at the University of Bologna, “How much can we bend the law in order to re-establish it again?” Kristan replied that restoring the rule of law does not mean returning to the pre-existing order that enabled state capture nor engaging in revenge, as “legal means fail the test; it is the same abuse with new owners”, pointing to Poland’s 2015 constitutional crisis as a cautionary tale. Instead, she explained that any departure from blocked formal rules must remain strictly conditional, proportionate, publicly reasoned and universally binding on the new majority as well. 

During the Q&A session, the audience raised three pressing issues critical to preventing future abuses: how to ensure professional governance in the defence sector and close the Criminal Procedure Code loophole that prevents victims from taking over prosecution when prosecutors dismiss complaints or stall investigations; how to revitalise independent trade unions across public institutions and the media; and how to reform legal education while enforcing existing codes of ethics across public services.

 

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Canary in the Coal Mine: Activism Resisting Authoritarianism in Georgia, Moldova and Serbia https://belgradesecurityconference.org/canary-in-the-coal-mine-activism-resisting-authoritarianism-in-georgia-moldova-and-serbia/ Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:20:01 +0000 https://belgradesecurityconference.org/?p=6725 At the Belgrade Security Conference, panel moderator Gábor Trenko, Senior Policy Officer at Amnesty International, opened the discussion titled “Canary in the Coal Mine: Activism Resisting Authoritarianism in Georgia, Moldova and Serbia”. The discussion examined the challenges facing civil society, independent media, and democratic institutions in EU candidate countries exposed to growing authoritarian pressures and […]

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At the Belgrade Security Conference, panel moderator Gábor Trenko, Senior Policy Officer at Amnesty International, opened the discussion titled “Canary in the Coal Mine: Activism Resisting Authoritarianism in Georgia, Moldova and Serbia”.

The discussion examined the challenges facing civil society, independent media, and democratic institutions in EU candidate countries exposed to growing authoritarian pressures and foreign interference. Panellists addressed the mechanisms used to silence dissent, including state-sponsored disinformation, the misuse of the judiciary, and restrictive legislation, alongside strategies for building democratic resilience, protecting civic space, and securing effective support from international partners. A clear consensus emerged: authoritarian practices are increasingly operating across national borders, and European policymakers must treat support for civil society and human rights as an essential investment in Europe’s own security rather than merely a transactional requirement.
Daniela-Filipa Soltan, Human Rights and Advocacy Coordinator at Amnesty International Moldova, discussed the challenge of responding to foreign information manipulation while safeguarding fundamental freedoms. While reiterating her full support for Moldova’s European integration, she cautioned that “this process doesn’t mean that the ends must justify the means”. She highlighted how emergency measures introduced following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine led to the suspension of media broadcasting licences, while legislation preserving arbitrary administrative powers over media operations remained in place even after the state of emergency ended. Soltan also addressed the fast-tracking of EU accession legislation, which frequently bypasses mandatory public consultation periods and curtails civic participation. She drew attention to the chilling effect and self-censorship experienced by journalists and civil society organisations as a result of political polarisation and dependence on external funding. Soltan argued that “we cannot treat national security, democratic freedom, and human rights as opposing goals”, stressing that effective resilience requires transparent administrative oversight, institutional safeguards, and the systematic integration of civil society recommendations into the EU accession process.
Ana Kakalashvili, a human rights lawyer from Georgia, examined the severe democratic backsliding taking place in the country despite strong public support for European and Euro-Atlantic integration. She described how government policies have stalled Georgia’s EU accession process, contributing to the closure of non-governmental organisations, the silencing of independent media, and the intimidation, prosecution, or exile of human rights defenders. Kakalashvili underscored Georgia’s strategic geopolitical position as a transit corridor and deep-sea port hub, warning that Russian and Chinese influence is expanding into key infrastructure while Western leverage appears to be diminishing. Arguing that Western partners are losing the narrative battle to Russian propaganda, she called for targeted sanctions against corrupt actors, the preservation of visa-free travel and Erasmus programmes for young people, and a sustained European presence on the ground. “Come to Georgia, go to the regions, and talk to the ordinary people. Pick up on the soft power game,” she urged European policymakers.
Maja Stojanović, Executive Director of Civic Initiatives, analysed the long-term process of state capture in Serbia, tracing its development since 2012. She explained how independent regulatory and anti-corruption bodies established after 2000 were progressively dismantled, while the EU accession framework relied heavily on formal box-ticking exercises that failed to reflect the erosion of democratic standards on the ground. Stojanović criticised international actors for prioritising superficial political stability and engaging exclusively with state authorities, reminding them that “stability is not about one authoritarian leader not making a mess—it’s about institutions and the rule of law” and that “the flag doesn’t mean the European Union; flags are supposed to mean values.” She also highlighted the emergence of new forms of civic action, noting how informal student movements and local initiatives have successfully re-engaged the public by focusing on tangible community concerns. Emphasising that while “you cannot make the momentum, you can build it,” she urged international partners to provide direct support to citizen-led democratic movements.
The discussion concluded with contributions from the audience, focusing on judicial independence and legal arguments in domestic courts. In response to questions about how national judiciaries handle human rights cases, Soltan noted that judicial vetting in Moldova had revealed deep-rooted corruption, leaving the Supreme Court severely understaffed, while files relating to past cases of police violence remained classified. Stojanović highlighted how courts in Serbia have increasingly served as instruments for imposing administrative penalties on peaceful protesters, while cautioning against framing international relations as a binary choice between EU integration and Russian influence. Panellists emphasised that democratic resistance must remain anchored in fundamental human rights, transparent governance, and active public participation.

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2031 an EU’s Enlargement Odyssey https://belgradesecurityconference.org/2031-an-eus-enlargement-odyssey/ Wed, 18 Nov 2026 13:35:16 +0000 https://belgradesecurityconference.org/?p=6708 The panel named ”2031: an EU’s Enlargement Odyssey” focused on the future of EU enlargement, looking towards the year 2031 and the future of the Odyssey-like candidate process that many Western Balkan countries and other candidate countries have. The panellists and moderator, who are involved in a 2-year research project named GEO-POWER-EU, focused on the […]

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The panel named ”2031: an EU’s Enlargement Odyssey” focused on the future of EU enlargement, looking towards the year 2031 and the future of the Odyssey-like candidate process that many Western Balkan countries and other candidate countries have.

The panellists and moderator, who are involved in a 2-year research project named GEO-POWER-EU, focused on the enlargement process and possible scenarios towards the year 2031, and took the opportunity to present their results and methodology. The panel was also focused on the panellists’ policy proposal advocating for a gradual institutional change in decision-making in the EU in relation to the enlargement process. The end note that united the panellists was the need to focus on the goals of the newly elected government in Serbia, rather than the pressure to define its foreign policy, as democratisation, state liberalisation, and fighting corruption are the steps needed to bring Serbia back on its EU path, looking towards 2031. 

 

 

The panel was opened by the moderator, Branimir Jovanović, economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, who painted a picture of the current situation of the candidature process that Western Balkan countries and countries such as Ukraine and Moldova are experiencing. Before starting the discussion, he described the GEO-POWER-EU research project and its methodology, which included a 2-year research process, 100 interviews, 20 focus groups, uniting 9 countries and using a unique tool – serious games. 

 

 

The panel was split into several rounds of questions, starting with Marcus How, Head of Research and Analysis at VE Insight, who focused on the comparison of the answers in the room vs. the answers their research collected. The four different scenarios were created by 45 human experts and 45 AI bots. The human experts were more pessimistic, favouring the status quo scenario with deepened economic integration into the EU, while the ‘nightmare scenario’ implied competitive fragmentation between candidate states.

On the other hand, Filip Ejdus, Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade, spoke about the serious games themselves and their use in teaching, advocacy and training, emphasising that their game was played out in the context of a future peace deal for Ukraine, with the main focus on the period from June 2028 to June 2029.

Nikolaos Tzifakis, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of the Peloponnese, continued to discuss the panellists’ proposal for a reformed decision-making process in the EU and the EU Commission’s proposal on qualified majority voting. He welcomed the Commission’s step but warned it was not enough, stressing the Council is still deadlocked, and shared his concern about countries aiming to veto and slow down the accession process. Following, Sonja Stojanović Gajić, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies South East Europe, University of Rijeka, spoke on her opinion towards candidate countries integrating themselves in EU defence projects. She believes that, ”in theory”, the Commission wishes for faster integration and common defence, but that, ”on paper”, it is only afraid of foreign influence in candidate countries. Therefore, she called for the need to focus on internal problems – democratisation, liberalisation and decriminalising intelligence and surveillance systems. 

 

 

In the second round of questions, Mr How emphasised that AI bridged the gap between the professional backgrounds of the human experts. A key takeaway from this intervention was that AI is more conservative and less willing to take risks because of its ”additive reasoning”. Mr Ejdus, on the other hand, continued explaining the methodology of their game, which is not used as a prediction tool but rather as a tool to ”shape potential plausible scenarios”. He shared insights that the EU needs to be a more credible security actor, providing security guarantees for candidates such as Ukraine, warning that if this goal is not reached, candidate countries could continue ”hedging strategies”.

Mr Tzifakis continued his intervention on their proposal, which envisions a gradual approach to reform. Mr Tzifakis stated that their team proposes a reinforced qualified majority system, with an example of 72% among countries’ members, accompanied by an emergency break whenever a member state raises a question of national interest – for clusters 1, 3 and chapters 34 and 35. For cluster 5, a reinforced qualified majority voting without an emergency break, and for technical questions, a reversed qualified majority voting, with a goal of gradually limiting the veto power in technical aspects of accession. Ms Stojanović Gajić, on the other hand, spoke on the risk of joining EU defence mechanisms, stating that ”any country needs to invest in defence”, warning that even neutral countries like Switzerland and Austria do not finance their long-term defence alone. She highlighted the fact that Serbia buys most of its weapons from China but also emphasised that there could be a future opportunity for Serbia to position its defence industry for investment towards the EU, given it is the biggest in the region.

 

 

After a round of questions from the audience, the last round of the panel started with Mr How, who spoke on the dilemma when candidate countries diversify their relations with non-EU countries. He stressed the potential challenge where cooperation with non-EU countries creates sectors or industries within the candidate countries that become incompatible with EU standards and US and NATO standards. Mr Ejdus deepened his answer on the game methodology, highlighting its strength as a non-linear projection tool, which resonates with our human need for fun and preparation for the unexpected, and stated that it gives us the opportunity to come up with ”scenarios nobody could have planned”. Mr Tzifakis deepened his response to the Proposal, marking that it would tangibly eliminate the veto in 26 out of 35 chapters. Ms Stojanović Gajić closed by touching on the defence cooperation and the Student List possible decision and saying that the new government should ask for assistance from the EU to tackle corruption, request special mechanisms outside the accession process to address vetting such as Albania, Moldova and Ukraine, and lastly stressed the need to depoliticise the police and surveillance in Serbia, which would bring it closer to the democratic and freedom requirements of the EU. 

 

 

The panel ended with another round of questions and a note that the EU and international community should give a ”grace period” to the new government in Serbia, allowing it to tackle corruption, state capture and democratisation, rather than instantly focusing on foreign policy. The panellists agreed that this internal approach would bring Serbia back on its EU path more strongly than simply focusing on foreign policy alignment with the EU.

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